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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether the event of a woman being competitively elected as a state legislator 
encourages the subsequent political participation of women, using a regression discontinuity design 
on constituency level data from India. We find that female incumbents are more likely than male 
incumbents to re-contest and that there is a decline in the entry of new women candidates. This 
decline is most pronounced in states with entrenched gender bias and in male-headed parties, 
suggesting an intensification of barriers against women in these areas. Similar results for (mostly 
male) Muslim candidates indicate the presence of institutionalized demand-side barriers rather than 
gender-specific preferences and constraints.  
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1. Introduction  
Women are under-represented in political office around the world, accounting for 
only 23% of the membership of national parliaments globally. In 2015, they comprised 12% 
of India’s national legislators, 19% of the United States Congress and 29% of the United 
Kingdom’s House of Commons. There is a similar under-representation of women in 
leadership positions in other fields, including the corporate sector and academia (Bertrand 
and Hallock 2001, Bertrand 2009, Ginther and Kahn forthcoming). For instance, women 
comprise 40% of the workforce globally, but only 10% of corporate board members globally 
and 4.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs. This numerical under-representation of women in politics 
is often associated with substantive under-representation. Several recent papers document 
that increasing women’s political representation results in policy choices that are more 
favorable to women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Rehavi 2012, Iyer et al. 2012), and that 
improve investments in children and lower corruption (Brollo and Troiano 2014, Bhalotra 
and Clots-Figueras 2014, Clots-Figueras 2012, Dollar, Fisman and Gatti 2001, Miller 2008, 
Swamy et al 2001). This suggests that women’s under-representation in political office 
disadvantages one half of society, and may have additional social costs.  
Using data from India’s state legislative assembly elections, we investigate whether 
the electoral success of women leads to subsequent increases in women’s participation as 
political candidates. We focus upon women’s candidacy as the data suggest that the small 
share of women candidates is an important proximate barrier to the presence of women in 
political office: women comprised 5.5% of election winners, but only 4.4% of electoral 
candidates.1 A woman’s demonstrated electoral success has the potential to change the views 
of voters and parties regarding the role of women in politics, leading to greater demand for 
women candidates. Alternatively, a woman winning could create a positive “role model” 
effect, encouraging other women to come forward as candidates.2 
We use nationwide data from 3473 constituencies over the period 1980-2007 to 
investigate whether a woman winning a seat in the state legislative assembly results in greater 
                                                
1 No previous work has systematically analyzed candidacy for competitive state assembly elections in India. 
Here we shall focus upon candidate gender and, in particular, on demonstration effects on candidacy.  
2 See Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015) for a model in which the roles of voters, parties and candidates are delineated.  
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participation of women from her constituency in subsequent elections. Legislation on many 
important topics, including law and order, health and education, is determined at the state 
level in India. Importantly, there are no political quotas for women at this level, making our 
analysis different from recent studies of the impact of gender quotas on subsequent political 
participation. In order to estimate causal effects of women’s electoral victory, we use a 
regression discontinuity (RD) design, comparing women’s political participation in places 
where a woman narrowly won an election to those in which a woman narrowly lost an 
election. We conduct several tests to verify the validity of the RD strategy. These include 
showing that that pre-determined political and demographic characteristics, as well as the 
characteristics of the candidate pool, are similar across places where women won vs lost in 
mixed-gender races. We investigate robustness to controlling for election-specific factors and 
using alternative samples, functional forms and bandwidths.  
Our analysis yields four main insights. First, a woman’s electoral victory leads to an 
increase in the share of women candidates from major parties in the next election. However, 
this is primarily driven by an increased propensity of the incumbent woman to contest for 
re-election. This intensive-margin response is important in India where, in contrast to the 
U.S., incumbents often do not re-contest. Moreover, the baseline probability of women 
incumbents re-contesting is smaller than for men: 34% of female incumbents and 28% of 
male incumbents do not run for re-election despite the absence of any term limits. The 
incumbency effect on women’s candidacy is restricted to the party of the winning candidate: 
women incumbents are significantly more likely than male incumbents to re-contest from 
the same party, and significantly less likely to switch parties. 
Second, we can decisively reject that there is increased entry of new major party 
women candidates in constituencies in which a woman won the previous election. In fact, in 
most specifications, there is a significant decline in the entry of new women candidates after 
a woman wins an election. This is not simply a consequence of the incumbent woman’s 
greater probability of re-contesting. There is also no increase in women candidates in nearby 
constituencies or from the opposing party. 
Third, we find striking evidence that this “discouragement” effect on the entry of 
new female candidates emerges from states characterized by entrenched gender bias, proxied 
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by population gender ratios (Sen 2003). In these states, there is a significantly lower 
candidacy response overall after a woman wins an election, particularly within male-headed 
parties, and the next election is marked by a significant decline in the share of new women 
candidates. In sharp contrast, in states with relatively low levels of entrenched prejudice, 
there is no decline in new female candidate share (although no increase either), and a larger 
probability that the incumbent woman re-contests. In these areas, following women’s 
electoral success, we also see significant increases in female and male voter turnout and the 
share of votes received by women. These findings are suggestive of a “backlash” effect in 
the more gender unequal states, as they indicate intensification of bias against women 
following women’s electoral victory. Previous studies have documented evidence of backlash 
whereby men react negatively to higher earnings of women or to women performing non-
traditional roles (Schuler et al 1996, Luke and Munshi 2011, Mani 2011, Gagliarducci and 
Paserman 2012, Bertrand et al 2013, Gangadharan et al 2015).3  
Fourth, our investigations suggest that the failure of new women candidates to 
contest after a woman wins in a competitive race is a reflection of institutionalized barriers 
to entry rather than of gender-specific constraints. We find that implementation of a gender 
quota in local governments, which created a massive increase in the number of women with 
political experience increases the overall candidacy response in gender-biased states, but we 
continue to see a decline in entry of new candidates. This makes it unlikely that our findings 
are driven by a shortage of women who are suitable political candidates. We conduct a 
parallel analysis for Muslims, who form India’s largest religious minority, are socio-
economically disadvantaged, and similarly under-represented in political office in India 
(Bhalotra et al 2014). Our estimates for Muslims are strikingly similar to our estimates for 
women: we find no increase in the entry of new Muslim candidates following a Muslim 
winning office and a stronger candidacy response in states in which Muslims are less 
disadvantaged.  As Muslim candidates are predominantly male, this makes it unlikely that the 
                                                
3 Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) report a similar heterogeneity in responses to women mayors in Italy. On 
average, they find a significantly greater probability of early termination of the legislature when the mayor is a 
woman, and this tendency is significantly stronger in the Southern regions and when the mayor interacts with 
an entirely male council. 
5 
 
results for women are on account of gender specific constraints such as family commitments 
or a reluctance to engage in competitive races.   
Our study contributes to two main streams of the literature. The first concerns the 
barriers facing women in attaining leadership positions. Most previous research examining 
the impact of elected women leaders on future women’s political participation has examined 
the impact of gender quotas.4 In contrast, our study investigates the dynamics of women’s 
participation in state legislatures, where quotas are absent. The results in a competitive 
setting are likely to differ from a quota context for several reasons. For instance, political 
parties may strategically place women candidates in races they are unlikely to win (Bagues 
and Esteve-Volart 2012, Casas-Arce and Saiz 2015) or selective entry may widen the quality 
gap between male and female candidates (Bardhan et al 2010, Besley et al 2012). This may 
reinforce negative stereotypes if women in reserved seats are less qualified than men (Coate 
and Loury 1993), or generate male backlash with men resentful of women in executive 
positions (Gangadharan et al. 2015). Another factor is that quotas may generate negative 
spillovers in candidacy, with fewer women being fielded in non-quota constituencies (see 
Sekhon and Titiunik 2012’s reanalysis of Bhavnani 2009’s quota results). For all of these 
reasons, demonstration effects of women leaders may be greater in competitive elections 
than in a quota setting. On the other hand, quotas may have more positive effects on 
women’s candidacy if women are more likely to enter competitive activities in a single-sex 
environment (Gneezy et al 2003).  
The only other study we are aware of in a competitive setting is Broockman (2013) 
who, similar to our study, finds no spillover effects of women winning seats in U.S. state 
legislatures on women’s candidacy in nearby constituencies. The findings from the analysis 
of quotas are mixed. Bertrand et al (2014) analyze corporate board quotas in Norway and 
find no impact on the career decisions of the next generation of women, while do Paola et al 
(2010) document increased political participation of women after a short-term gender quota 
in local government in Italy. Beaman et al (2009) find no tangible improvements in 
subsequent candidacy or success among women after a woman has led the village council for 
                                                
4 Beaman et al (2009), Bhavnani (2009), Deininger and Nagarajan (2011) and Banerjee et al (2013) all examine 
the impact of local government gender quotas in specific regions of India.  
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one term (five years), but significant increases after a woman has headed the village council 
for two consecutive terms. We show that such repeated exposure to female state legislators 
is unlikely in a competitive setting, especially in gender-biased states; although incumbent 
women are more likely to re-contest than incumbent men, they are not significantly more 
likely to win the next time.  
The second stream of research that we contribute to is that on incumbency 
advantage. This literature has focused upon whether incumbents are more likely to win the 
next election, but winning is conditional on re-contesting and by testing whether the 
incumbent re-contests, we effectively model this selection process.5 This is important in 
many countries outside the US, such as India and Brazil, where a large fraction of 
incumbents do not re-contest (De Magalhaes 2015). Studies examining gender differences in 
incumbency advantage include Ferreira and Gyourko (2014), who show that female 
incumbents exhibit stronger winning chances in the U.S. (a setting where incumbents almost 
always re-contest) and Brollo and Troiano (2014) who find weaker winning chances in 
Brazil, a setting with term limits. Our study shows that candidacy dynamics after an electoral 
victory are strongly dependent on the overall social context, and that therefore there is no 
general gender advantage or disadvantage. Another contribution of our work is that we 
deviate from the recent tendency to analyze incumbency advantage at the party level. In the 
presence of party-switching, such as occurs in India and Brazil for example, it is relevant to 
study incumbent behavior at the candidate level.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides relevant 
background on the Indian political system, Section 3 describes our empirical strategy, and 
Section 4 performs many empirical checks on the validity of this strategy. Sections 5 and 6 
present our empirical findings, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                
5 There is a widely documented incumbency advantage in the U.S. (Lee 2008, Gelman and King 1990, Cox and 
Katz 1996, Ferreira and Gyourko 2014), but previous work has documented an incumbency disadvantage in 
India (Linden 2004, Uppal 2009) and other developing countries (Klasnja and Titiunik 2013, MacDonald 2013). 
Most of these studies do not examine candidacy. 
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2. Women in Indian Politics  
2.1.       Indian Electoral Politics 
India is the world’s largest democracy, with a parliamentary system of government at 
both the central and state levels. Elections are held every five years, on a first-past-the-post 
system in single-member constituencies. States may occasionally hold midterm elections, 
before the five-year term when the government expires, if the governing coalition loses the 
confidence of the majority of the state legislature and an alternative government cannot be 
formed. We focus on elections to state legislatures. In India’s federal system, state 
governments are responsible for several development policy areas including law and order, 
health and education, and for the financing of village councils. State level parties play a 
significant role in forming governing coalitions at the center, and previous research has 
shown that state-level voting behavior is highly correlated with voting in national elections 
(Ravishankar 2009).  
There are currently no quotas for women in state or national level elections. A one-
third quota for women in district and village level councils was mandated by a constitutional 
amendment in 1993.6 In March 2010, a bill proposing to enact a one-third quota for women 
in national and state legislatures was passed by the upper house of parliament, but it has not 
yet been passed in the lower house, making the analysis in this paper highly topical.  
In India’s political system, party leaders decide who their candidate will be in every 
constituency. There are no primaries as in the United States, and the process of choosing 
candidates is not transparent. We conducted interviews with politicians from several Indian 
political parties to understand the candidate selection process. In general, it was described as 
follows: parties draw up an initial short list of 2-5 candidates from each constituency, and 
then embark on information gathering exercises, including third-party voter surveys, to 
assess candidate quality. The candidate quality emphasized by the parties was the ability to 
attract votes, termed “winnability” in Indian politics. To this end, several metrics including 
candidate name recognition within the constituency, service to the party, financial resources, 
caste identity and internal party support were considered relevant. The candidate selection 
                                                
6 The impact of this reform has been examined in several recent papers including Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004), Beaman et al (2009) and Iyer et al (2012).  
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process was described as being very constituency specific, with local name recognition and 
local resources being important and it being unusual to “parachute” in candidates from 
outside the constituency.  
 
2.2.  Data on Women’s Political Participation in State Elections 
We obtained data on elections to state legislative assemblies in 3473 constituencies 
from the Election Commission of India over the period 1980-2007, during which most 
states had six elections. Electoral constituency boundaries remained fixed through this 
period, so we do not have to worry about concerns such as gerrymandering which might 
differentially affect the electoral prospects for women. We have information on the name, 
gender, party affiliation and votes obtained by every candidate, as well as gender-specific 
voter turnout by constituency. We use data for the 16 major states of India that account for 
over 95% of the total population.7 We also obtained relevant demographic data (literacy, 
urbanization) at the constituency level from the 2001 census, by matching villages to 
constituencies.8 
We tracked candidates by name over successive elections to identify whether 
candidates in a specific election were present in the previous election.9 Overall, in our 
sample, more than three-quarters of all candidates (85% of women and 83% of men) did not 
contest the previous election, i.e. are “new” candidates. Systematic data on candidate 
attributes are available only after 2004, when the Election Commission made it mandatory 
for all candidates to file affidavits giving details of their age, education, asset ownership and 
any pending criminal charges. We have this information for candidates in 14 out of 16 states, 
which held elections between 2004 and 2007. Compared to male candidates, women 
candidates are on average three years younger, less likely to have completed high school, and 
                                                
7 The states included are: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
In 2001, three new states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand were carved out of the larger states of 
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh respectively. For the new states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, 
electoral constituency boundaries remained fixed over time. We drop the data from the Uttarakhand state 
elections of 2002 and 2007 since we are unable to match the electoral constituencies over time. 
8 We thank Rikhil Bhavnani and Sandip Sukhtankar for sharing these data with us. 
9 Candidate names are often spelt differently across elections and candidates often change party affiliations. We 
therefore performed a manual matching of candidate names over time. 
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less likely to have any criminal charges filed against them (summary statistics available upon 
request). In examining the validity of our regression discontinuity strategy, we will test 
whether these characteristics vary across winners and losers in mixed-gender elections.  
Despite the institution of universal adult suffrage since 1950, women are still 
dramatically under-represented in India’s state legislatures. As mentioned earlier, only 5.5% 
of state legislators and 4.4% of candidates were women in our sample period, 1980-2007. 
Almost 70% of electoral races had no female candidates at all, and only 7% of races had 
more than one woman candidate. Women’s candidacy shows a secular increase over the 
period, but varies considerably across the states. For instance, in 2000-2007, the share of 
female candidates from major parties ranged from almost 13% in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh to only 4% in the neighboring state of Karnataka (Appendix Figure A1).  
Major parties (defined as parties that won more than 5 percent of the seats in the 
state in any year) are more likely to nominate women candidates, with 5.6% of their 
candidates being women. Over this period, only four out of forty major parties in India were 
headed by women.10 These parties have a slightly higher share of female candidates, 7% 
compared to the 5% share for major parties not headed by women. There is no a priori 
evidence that women avoid more competitive races. In fact, electoral races in which a female 
candidate is present tend to have larger electorates and a greater number of candidates.  
State elections in India are very competitive. In our data, the mean (median) number 
of candidates per constituency is ten (eight). Of these, only 34% (2.6 candidates on average) 
are from major political parties and only 3 candidates on average manage to obtain more 
than 5 percent of the total votes, suggesting that the majority of candidates in India’s 
electoral races are not politically viable. In the analysis to follow, we therefore consistently 
present results separately for major party candidates and competitive candidates in order to 
focus on candidates who are politically meaningful.11  
 
                                                
10 These are the Indian National Congress under Sonia Gandhi, the Bahujan Samaj Party under Mayawati, the 
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam under Jayalalithaa and the All India Trinamul Congress under 
Mamata Banerjee. 
11 There is a strong overlap between these categories. The vast majority (88%) of major party candidates are 
competitive in the sense of obtaining at least 5% of total votes cast. Similarly, about 73% of competitive 
candidates belong to a major party.  
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3. Identifying the Effects of Women’s Electoral Success: The Regression 
Discontinuity Design  
 We are interested in how indicators of women’s political participation at the electoral 
constituency level respond to a woman having won the previous election. The identification 
problem is that a woman’s political victory might be correlated with unobserved 
constituency characteristics such as voter preferences, which might directly determine 
women’s participation in subsequent elections. We address these problems using a regression 
discontinuity (RD) estimator, which focuses on mixed-gender electoral races decided by a 
narrow margin. Treatment assignment depends on the running variable, the vote margin 
between a woman and a man. The probability of a woman winning an election exhibits a 
sharp discontinuity when this vote margin is zero, since the candidate with the most votes 
wins, irrespective of how close the runner up stands.12 The identifying assumption is that the 
assignment of treatment around the threshold (i.e. a woman winner rather than a man) is 
uncorrelated with any observed or unobserved characteristics of the candidate pool or the 
constituency.13 The estimated model is of the form: 
 
(1)  Yist = a + b WomanWonis, t -1 + f(Mis,t -1)  +  e ist  
 
Y ist  is a measure of female political candidacy for constituency i in state s and year t. We 
focus upon the share of women candidates (overall and among major parties) but we also 
look at the probability of having at least one female candidate in the constituency and the 
fraction of competitive female candidates. The sample is restricted to elections with at least 
one female candidate. Similar to the strategy in Meyersson (2014), the running variable Mis,t-1 
is defined as the vote share difference between the female and male candidates in the 
constituency who obtained the most votes, irrespective of whether they were the winner and 
the runner up. The results are similar when we use a more restricted sample of elections 
                                                
12 See Lee (2008) for the seminal use of the regression discontinuity design using electoral data. Studies that use 
close elections between men and women include Rehavi (2012), Clots-Figueras (2011 and 2012), Bhalotra and 
Clots-Figueras (2014), and Brollo and Troiano (2014). 
13 We thus implicitly test whether winning matters discontinuously, that is, significantly more than a good 
electoral performance that falls short of winning (captured by woman being runners-up in the “control group” 
of constituencies in which women lose mixed-gender elections).  
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selected to ensure that the winner and runner are of opposite gender. WomanWonis, t -1 is a 
dummy which equals one if a woman won against a man (Mis,t-1 >0) and zero if a woman 
lost against a man (Mis,t-1 <0). The parameter b  captures the causal impact of this event on 
women’s participation as candidates in the next election. Standard errors are clustered at the 
level of the administrative district to allow for correlated outcomes across all constituencies 
within the same district and over time. This is more conservative than clustering at the 
constituency level, though we shall verify that doing the latter leaves our results unchanged.  
We fit a flexible function of the vote margin, f (Mis,t -1) , that is allowed to differ on 
each side of the discontinuity, using three approaches to investigate sensitivity of the 
estimates to this. First, we fit second-order polynomials (e.g. Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004) 
since Gelman and Imbens (2014) argue against the use of higher order polynomials in RD 
designs, but we also show that our results are robust to using higher-order polynomials. 
Second, we estimate local linear regressions (Hahn et al, 2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2007), 
restricting the sample to an optimal bandwidth around the discontinuity, with the optimal 
bandwidth selected by applying the methods in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011) and also 
the methods in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Finally, we also investigate 
robustness to using a “discontinuity sample,” restricting the sample to a very small 
bandwidth around the discontinuity and testing the differences in means on both sides of the 
discontinuity (Angrist and Lavy, 1999). 
To investigate area spillovers, we replace the dependent variable in (1) with an 
indicator of women’s political participation in constituencies other than the index 
constituency i, but within the same administrative district (which typically consists of 9-10 
electoral constituencies), or parliamentary constituency (typically covering 6-8 state electoral 
constituencies). To examine persistence in the relationship of interest, we estimate equation 
(1) replacing the first lag with longer lags. This provides reduced form estimates of how 
women’s participation in election t responds to a woman having won in election t-2 or t-3 
(ten and fifteen years ago), respectively. We do not condition upon whether a woman won in 
each intervening period because this is endogenous.  
While regression discontinuity estimates are likely to satisfy internal validity 
conditions, they may or may not have external validity. However, there are several 
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indications that our results have considerable external validity. First, Figure 1A shows that 
the vote share obtained by all women contesting in constituencies in which the margin of 
victory between the male and female candidates is close to zero ranges from less than 20% 
to 65%. In favor of external validity, this shows a wide variation in preferences for female 
politicians in our sample. Second, we examined the extent to which the identity of 
constituencies that have mixed-gender elections changes from one election year to the next 
and found that there is a fair degree of churning; among the constituencies which have at 
least one mixed-gender election, nearly 60% have had only one or two mixed-gender 
elections over this three-decade period. This again points to external validity inasmuch as it 
establishes that we are not simply picking up a feature of constituencies that have mixed-
gender elections. In addition, OLS results using the whole sample are fairly similar to the RD 
results.14 Since constituencies that have at least one woman candidate vary over time, 
restricting to these samples creates an unbalanced panel (Sekhon and Titiunik 2012). We 
therefore estimated the coefficient of interest for one pair of election years at a time to 
investigate the stability of the relationship across areas and years, and found no significant 
differences in the estimates (available on request). 
 
4. Investigating Validity of the RD Design 
Before presenting our results, we conduct several checks to ensure the validity of our 
empirical strategy, namely that the only variable that varies discontinuously at the vote 
margin of zero is the gender of the elected candidate, rather than other area or candidate 
characteristics, or the vote margin itself. 
 
4.1.   Preferences for Women Politicians and Continuity of the Vote Margin 
An assumption underlying the RD strategy is that preferences for female politicians 
are similar on both sides of the discontinuity, so that the discontinuity isolates the role of the 
gender of the winner. We measure preferences for female politicians as the fraction of votes 
                                                
14 We run OLS regressions for the full sample, controlling for constituency and election-cycle fixed effects, and 
district-specific linear time trends. The OLS sample differs primarily in that it introduces elections in which 
there are no female candidates, thereby extending the “control group” of constituencies to include a wider and 
more heterogeneous set of areas. These results are available in Appendix Table A2. 
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won by all women contesting in the constituency. Figure 1B shows that the assumption 
holds, there being no jump in the female vote share at the zero vote margin.  
Another RD assumption is that the density of the running variable, the vote margin 
between the female and the male candidate, is continuous at the winning threshold, i.e. at the 
zero vote margin. We plotted the density of the vote margin which looks smooth throughout 
(Figure 2A) and, following McCrary (2008), we formally verify that there is no significant 
discontinuity at the zero point (Figure 2B). Manipulation of the vote margin is unlikely in 
our setting, since the Election Commission of India has a well-established reputation for 
independence and political neutrality, and Indian elections are considered free and fair. 
 
4.2.  Continuity in Candidate Characteristics  
We verify that the characteristics of the candidate pool are very similar across places 
where women win elections and places where women do not.  Figure 3 examines a range of 
candidate characteristics including whether any criminal charges have been filed against the 
candidate (including corruption charges), education levels, net worth, whether the incumbent 
is in the race, and whether there are candidates from women-headed parties.15 
Recent studies have questioned the validity of the RD premise that the (party) 
identity of the winner is quasi-random in close elections, showing that the incumbent party 
in U.S. elections tends to have systematically greater chances of winning even when elections 
are close, consistent with incumbents using their greater power to manipulate their chances 
(Caughey and Sekhon 2011, Grimmer et al, 2011). However, Eggers et al (2013) argue that 
such sorting is unique to the U.S. House in the post-war period, and find no evidence of it in 
several other countries including India. Along these lines, we verified that candidate 
                                                
15 Female politicians may be more likely to have family connections to other politicians than male politicians in 
India’s national parliament (French 2011) and in the US (Dal Bó et al 2009). Due to the large number of 
candidates for state legislative assembly elections across the country we are unable to replicate the French 
(2011) methodology of contacting local journalists in each constituency to assess the extent of such 
connections at the local level. As French says, “It was not enough to take prominent names and make larger 
deductions from them. Equally, much of the information did not seem to exist. Only someone who worked at 
a local level, perhaps as a political journalist, would be likely to know how each MP in their area entered 
politics.” However, it is unlikely that family connections of the winner matter in mixed-gender close elections, 
given that we show all other observable characteristics of the winner and the runner-up to be similar.  
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characteristics such as age, gender, education, net worth or incumbency do not predict 
success in mixed-gender races (results available upon request). 
 
4.3.  Continuity in Demographic and Political Characteristics 
We also verified that a range of demographic covariates (population gender ratios, 
literacy rates, proportion of lower castes and backward tribes, the male-female literacy 
differential) and pre-determined electoral variables (total number of votes polled, the 
number of major party female candidates and female voter turnout in the previous election) 
do not vary discontinuously at the RD threshold (Figures 4A-4G). This gives us confidence 
that our results do not reflect pre-existing trends across places where women won or did not 
win elections. 
 
5. Main Results: Does Women’s Political Participation Respond to Prior 
Electoral Success? 
We first investigate whether women’s electoral success leads to an increase in the 
share of female candidates in the next election, and test robustness to varying the RD 
specification. We find an increase in the overall share of major party women candidates 
following a woman’s electoral victory, primarily driven by women incumbents being more 
likely to re-contest than male incumbents. We find no increase in the entry of new women 
candidates and, in some specifications, a decline. In section 6, we investigate the potential 
mechanisms behind these findings. 
 
5.1.  Political Candidacy 
The event of a woman winning an election leads to a large and statistically significant 
increase of 18.5 percentage points in the probability of a major party fielding at least one 
woman candidate in the subsequent election in her constituency (Table 1, Panel A, column 
1). This translates into an 8.5 percentage point increase in the female share of major party 
candidates (column 2), which corresponds to 40% of a standard deviation in the sample of 
constituencies with at least one female candidate. A visual representation of these estimates 
is in Figure 5A, which shows a jump in the probability of having a major party female 
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candidate at the zero vote margin, to the left of which a woman narrowly lost the previous 
election and to the right of which a woman narrowly won the previous election against a 
man. We see a similar discontinuity for the female share of major party candidates (Figure 
5B). As the share of female candidates will rise if there are more women or if there are fewer 
candidates in all, we investigated candidate numbers. We find an increase in the number of 
major party female candidates (column 3); and no significant change in the total number of 
candidates from major parties (column 4), which indicates that women candidates effectively 
substitute for male candidates.  
The share of women among competitive candidates, defined as those who get at least 
5% of total votes cast, also increases significantly (column 5). This is consistent with the 
strong overlap between major party and competitive candidates, and establishes that the 
increase in candidacy that we observe following an electoral victory by a female politician is 
of politically viable women fielded by politically relevant parties. In contrast to the observed 
increase in women’s candidacy within major parties, the fraction of independent women 
candidates—those not affiliated with any party—does not increase (column 6).16 We find no 
significant impact of women having won the previous election on the chances of a woman 
winning the current election (column 7). This is consistent with previous evidence indicating 
an incumbency disadvantage in Indian state elections (Linden 2004, Uppal 2009).  
 
5.2.  Robustness of RD Estimates 
We investigate robustness of the estimates to varying the functional form of the 
running variable in regressions run on the full sample, to estimating local linear regressions 
with varying bandwidths (including a very narrow discontinuity sample), to controlling for 
election-specific factors, and to restricting the sample to elections in which the top two vote-
getters are a man and a woman. We also present a placebo check in which we vary the 
discontinuity point. 
 
 
                                                
16 Given that major parties account for only 30% of candidates overall, we find no increase in overall female 
candidacy after a woman’s electoral victory. 
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5.2.1. Robustness to functional form and sample for the running variable  
The specification in Table 1 (Panel A) controls for a quadratic polynomial in the 
victory margin, which is allowed to be different on either side of the discontinuity. We verify 
that the coefficients on the suite of outcomes in Table 1 remains similar in size and 
significance when a local linear regression is estimated on a sample restricted to an optimal 
bandwidth around the discontinuity, using optimal bandwidths as specified by Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2011) in Panel B and by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) in Panel C.  
We conduct further checks for the female share of major party candidates, which is 
the main outcome in Table 1. First we generalize the polynomial in the victory margin to the 
third and fourth order, retaining the full sample, and we find very little change in the 
coefficient of interest (Appendix Table A3, columns 1 and 2) We then restrict the sample to 
small bandwidths of 0.1 and then 0.05, controlling for linear trends on either side of the 
discontinuity in the first case and simply comparing the mean of the dependent variable on 
both sides of the discontinuity for the smaller bandwidth, along the lines of Angrist and 
Lavy (1999), and our results remain unchanged. The estimates in column 5 examine the 
stability of the estimated coefficient to inclusion of a vector of state-year fixed effects which 
control for all relevant election-specific factors such as whether the previous Chief Minister 
was a woman, whether there was a woman party leader in the current election, or whether a 
new woman-headed party had been formed. The estimated coefficient retains its size and 
significance. Our results are also unchanged if we cluster the standard errors at the finer 
constituency level rather than the district level (column 6). 
Finally, we restrict the sample to elections where a woman and a man were among 
the top two candidates in terms of votes won. The coefficients are similar to the baseline 
results in size and significance, both when we control for a second-order polynomial on 
either side of the discontinuity (column 7) and when we use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
optimal bandwidth (column 8).  
 
5.2.2. Fake or placebo discontinuities 
We tested for discontinuous increases in candidacy at points of the vote margin 
distribution at which there should be no jumps, that is, at points other than zero, as 
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suggested in Imbens and Lemieux (2007). We implemented a placebo check re-computing 
the RD estimates using “fake” discontinuities at various points both to the left and to the 
right of the discontinuity. Appendix Figure A2 plots the t-statistics obtained from this series 
of RD estimates. We see that the largest t-statistic is at the real discontinuity, i.e. at the zero 
point, while all other t-statistics at placebo discontinuity points indicate statistical 
insignificance.  
 
5.3. New Candidate Entry vs  Incumbent Candidacy  
In this section, we examine how much of the observed rise in women’s candidacy is 
attributable to the entry of new women candidates. We find no evidence of new candidate 
entry, in fact, the regression coefficient for the new female share of major party candidates is 
negative and statistically significant for two of the three RD estimators (Table 2, column 1, 
Panels A and B); we investigate this in more detail below. There is no significant impact of 
women’s victory on the entry of new male candidates (column 2).  
However, incumbent women are significantly more likely to run for re-election than 
incumbent men (column 3). This is an important margin of response, because there is a 
gender gap that disfavors women in the baseline probability of women incumbents running 
for re-election: 34% of female winners and 28% of male winners do not run for re-election 
in the full sample. Since party-switching is frequent in India, we investigated incumbent 
candidacy by party. We find that women incumbents are more likely than male incumbents 
to contest from the incumbent party (Table 2, column 4), and significantly less likely to 
switch parties in the election after they win (column 5). These results retain their size and 
significance regardless of the specification or the bandwidth used (Table 2, Panels B and C). 
They are consistent with, for instance, the implications of a dynamic model of statistical 
discrimination in which, under plausible conditions on post-recruitment behavior, “belief-
flipping” may occur, with successful women being favored over successful men (Fryer 
2007).17  
                                                
17 It is conceivable that new women are less likely to contest when the incumbent is a woman because, if the 
incumbent woman re-contests and if votes are “gendered” then her contesting would split the vote, making it 
harder for a new woman to win. While we cannot test this rigorously because the incumbent’s decision to 
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5.4. Candidacy Spillovers across Parties and Constituencies 
In this section, we first examine party-level (rather than candidate-level) responses 
and then examine whether there are any spillovers of a woman winning in a given 
constituency on women’s participation in nearby constituencies. We find that, in 
constituencies where women won the previous election, it is strictly only the winner’s party 
that is more likely to field a woman candidate in the next election and, as we saw above, this 
candidate tends to be the winner herself. Parties that lost the previous election to a woman 
are significantly less likely to nominate a woman (Table 3, columns 1 and 2). The losing party 
typically fielded a man so this result simply means that in the next election, despite the man 
losing to a woman, they continued to field a man. While the presence of an incumbent 
woman politician might discourage new female candidates in her constituency (as it would 
split the gendered votes), it might nevertheless encourage greater participation in nearby 
areas. However, we find no evidence of increased female candidacy, whether from the 
incumbent party or other parties, in constituencies within the same district (Table 3, columns 
3 and 4) or within the same national parliamentary constituencies (columns 5 and 6). In 
separate regressions (not shown), we replaced the female share of candidates with the new 
female share and found similar results, i.e., that there is no tendency towards increased entry 
of new women in nearby constituencies. Using data from the U.S., Broockman (2013) 
similarly finds no impact of a woman being elected on the participation of women in nearby 
areas.  
In the next section, we push the analysis further by investigating voter, party and 
candidate responses to women winning with a view to understanding better the mechanisms 
behind our findings.  
 
6. Candidate Demand and Candidate Supply 
In this section we investigate whether the weak demonstration effects we find are 
driven primarily by “demand-side” factors, such as voter and party attitudes towards women 
candidates, or by limitations on the supply of potential candidates, such as a shortage of 
                                                                                                                                            
contest is endogenous, we have verified that the impact on new female candidate entry does not differ by 
whether the incumbent chooses to run for re-election.    
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suitable female candidates, or the existence of gender-specific constraints that make women 
less likely than men to contest as candidates. We use male and female electoral turnout, votes 
cast for women vs men, and women’s winning chances as indicators of voter preferences,18 
and the gender of the party leader as an indicator of party preferences over women.  
 
6.1. Heterogeneity by Indicators of Gender Prejudice  
Since the views of voters and parties are likely to be shaped by prevailing social norms 
regarding the role of women, we investigate whether the candidacy response to electoral 
victory varies by indicators of this. India has a long history of gender prejudice that has 
resulted in millions of women “missing” on account of sex-selective abortion, female 
infanticide and discrimination against girls in terms of nutrition and health care. There were 
940 women per 1000 men in India in the 2011 census which translates to about 0.86 million 
“missing women.” The population sex ratio is now widely used to proxy for women’s social 
disadvantage (Sen 2003, Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010, Jayachandran and Kuzeimko 2011). 
The population gender ratio varies widely across states, from 861 in Haryana in the North to 
1058 in Kerala in the South. A remarkable division seems to run right across India, splitting 
the country into two nearly contiguous halves, with missing women in the North and West 
but not in the South and East of the country (Sen 2003, Dyson and Moore 1983), and some 
studies have attributed this to time-invariant factors such as soil quality (Carranza 2014). In 
view of this marked heterogeneity across states, we re-estimate the response of women’s 
candidacy to women winning for the groups of states with sex ratios above and below the 
median.  
We find a much bigger response of women’s candidacy to women’s electoral victory 
in states in which the population sex ratio is less skewed or more favorable to women (Table 
4, columns 1 and 2). In particular, the female share of major party candidates increases by 
5.2 percentage points in states where the gender ratio is skewed against women, while the 
corresponding effect is 13.9 percentage points in states where the gender ratio is less biased, 
                                                
18 Political scientists often associate group-specific turnout with bias. For instance, Washington (2006) shows 
that black and white turnout rates increase in response to black men on the ballot in U.S. elections. 
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and this difference in the RD coefficients is statistically significant.19 This remarkable 
difference is driven both by a difference in the share of new women candidates, where a 
negative effect is observed only in the more gender-biased states (columns 3 and 4 and 
Appendix Figure A3), and in the share of non-new female candidates (columns 5 and 6). 
This suggests that a social context that disadvantages women leads to a weaker candidacy 
response by both new and non-new candidates after a woman demonstrates the ability to 
win an election. This finding indicates no decline in statistical discrimination among voters.20  
While the results in Table 4 are estimated using state-level gender ratios from the 
2001 census, the results are robust to using gender literacy gaps, gender ratios in earlier 
census files, or gender ratios at the constituency level. We first show that these patterns hold 
up to using a different proxy for women’s status, namely the male-female literacy differential. 
Women’s educational outcomes are much poorer than those of men: only 65% of women in 
India were recorded as literate in the census of 2011, compared to 82% of men. We find that 
the female candidacy response to women winning is weaker in states where the male-female 
literacy differential is below the median, and that a significant “discouragement” effect on 
new women candidates is present only for these states (Appendix Table A4, columns 1 and 
2). Both of these pattern, namely, a lower overall candidacy response and a significant 
negative effect on the entry of new women candidates, are present when we use either the 
gender ratios from the 1981 census (columns 3 and 4) or gender ratios at the constituency 
rather than the state level (columns 5 and 6). Note that the constituency-level gender ratios 
are subject to the influence of migration across constituency boundaries, while cross-state 
migration in India is extremely low (Mistry 2015).  
A potential explanation of the results is backlash, namely that seeing women in 
leadership positions intensifies societal bias against women and that this is exhibited in voter 
and party leader behavior. This would be more likely to be the case in more gender-biased 
areas. We investigate this in the next section.  
                                                
19 The difference in the coefficients was tested using a difference-in-discontinuities specification following 
Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (forthcoming). The assumptions of this model are milder than those required 
for a cross-sectional RD design or for a difference-in-differences strategy 
20 Statistical discrimination involves stereotypes generated by the average performance of a group being applied 
to individual members of the group, and the reason that groups who are in an effective minority are often 
discriminated against is that the signal they emit is noisier (Phelps 1972). 
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6.2.  Voter and Party Behavior 
Since candidates are chosen by political parties with a view to winning elections, 
party choices will reflect any gender bias among voters, as well as any bias among party 
leaders over and above voter bias. We examine whether voters and parties behave differently 
after observing a woman winning, distinguishing the behavior of male and female voters and 
male and female party leaders.  
Voter behavior is indicated by electoral turnout and by votes cast for female as 
opposed to male candidates. We find that both female and male voter turnout are 
significantly greater in constituencies that were won by women in the preceding election but 
only in states with more equal gender ratios, there being no significant response in the more 
gender-prejudiced states (Table 5, Panel A, columns 1-4). A woman’s electoral victory 
increases the vote share of all women candidates and the chances of a woman winning the 
next election, more in states with better gender ratios compared to states with worse gender 
ratios, indicating a preference for women leaders in the better states. However, these 
differences in the coefficients are not statistically significant (Table 5, Panel B, columns 1-4).  
 If voters or party-leaders are more likely to update their views after repeated 
exposure to women leaders, we might observe larger effects on political candidacy over time. 
However, there are very few constituencies in India in which women win a state assembly 
seat in a competitive election for two consecutive terms (less than 5% of our RD sample), 
making it hard to test for this repeated exposure effect in our data. Moreover, winning the 
second time is endogenous in the competitive setting, so we investigate the reduced form i.e. 
the response of candidacy in election t to a woman having won two elections ago (t-2) and 
three elections ago (t-3). At the ten-year mark (two elections later), we see a marginally 
significant increase in the share of women candidates from major parties in the states with 
better gender ratios and no effect at all on overall female candidacy in states with worse 
gender ratios (Table 5, Panel C, columns 1 and 2). At the fifteen-year mark, the candidacy 
response drops to effectively zero in all states (Table 5, Panel C, columns 3 and 4). 
We now examine the role of parties. If the different results we noted in more and 
less prejudiced contexts are attributable to intensification of gender bias within parties, and if 
male-headed parties are more likely to show such intensification, then we expect a lower 
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candidacy response in male-headed parties in gender-biased areas. This is indeed what we 
find: candidacy responses to women’s electoral victory are similar across all states among 
parties headed by women (Table 6, Panel A, columns 1 and 2).  Among parties headed by 
men, however, we see a significantly higher candidacy response in states with better gender 
ratios (Table 6, Panel A, columns 3 and 4). The patterns for new female candidates are 
similar across male and female headed parties (Table 6, Panel B), suggesting that gender bias 
intensification within parties tends to make the path to candidacy more difficult for women 
who participated in the previous election.  
Overall, the results are consistent with women’s electoral victory leading to an 
intensification of gender bias in more gender-prejudiced states, particularly within male-
headed parties. This is of course the opposite of the prediction of a model of statistical 
discrimination.21 Our finding that, in less prejudiced states, incumbent women are more 
likely than incumbent men to re-contest is consistent with statistical discrimination being 
lowered for women who have been selected in (as in Fryer 2007). However, in more 
prejudiced states, we see what would appear to be a rise in taste-based discrimination.  
In the next section, we examine two alternative explanations related to potential 
constraints on the supply of new candidates. First, we examine the extent to which a 
shortage of suitably experienced potential women candidates is a binding constraint. Second, 
to investigate the extent to which barriers to the entry of new women are gender-specific, we 
perform a parallel analysis of candidates belonging to a religious minority group (Muslims), 
who are also under-represented in political office. 
 
6.3. Supply of Experienced Candidates 
The failure of new women candidates to contest in women-led constituencies may 
reflect a shortage of suitably qualified women candidates.  In general, it is difficult to find 
experimental or exogenous variation, but we are able to exploit a massive shock to the 
availability of women with political experience created by the institution of quotas for 
women in local government. A constitutional amendment of 1993 set aside one-third of all 
                                                
21 Statistical discrimination involves stereotypes generated by the average performance of a group being applied 
to individual members of the group, and the reason that groups who are in an effective minority are often 
discriminated against is that the signal they emit is noisier (Phelps 1972). 
23 
 
seats in village, municipality and district councils for women, a large increase from the pre-
reform share of approximately 5%. This created a cadre of women with the experience, 
networks and potentially, the motivation to remain on the fast track and contest for 
legislative assembly seats. As in Iyer et al (2012), we use plausibly exogenous state-specific 
variation in the implementation of the mandate and obtain separate RD estimates for 
women’s candidacy response to women winning for periods before and after the 
implementation of the local government quota.  
We find a significantly higher candidacy response after quotas are implemented, but 
only in states with more biased gender ratios (Table 7, Panel A, columns 1-4). In neither 
group of states is the share of new candidates significantly different after the introduction of 
quotas (Table 7, Panel B). Overall, there is no evidence that shortages of suitably 
experienced women candidates drive our result that there is no new entry after a woman 
wins.  
 
6.4. Gender-Specific Constraints 
Even if there is a cadre of women politicians in local government councils, they may 
be reluctant to compete for the post of state legislator, a post that is far more demanding. 
Recent work has highlighted gender-specific barriers to women’s participation in executive 
positions, which are competitive and typically involve intensive and inflexible work 
schedules (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz 2010). Laboratory evidence suggests that women tend 
to be less over-confident and more averse to competition than men (Niederle forthcoming, 
Petrie and Segal 2014), and a number of studies underline the role of fertility and family 
commitments in limiting women’s careers (Goldin 2014). A related possibility is an increased 
reluctance of potential women candidates to enter politics due to “stereotype threat,” which 
refers to minority groups behaving in ways that confirm group stereotypes when their group 
identity is made salient.22  
                                                
22 Stereotype threat, often measured by the performance of minority groups in standardized tests or 
participation in meetings, has been documented for racial minorities (Steele and Aronson 1995), lower castes in 
India (Hoff and Pandey 2006), women (Kray et al 2002, Marx and Roman 2002) and men in areas of female 
expertise (Coffman 2014), but it has not been considered in the literature on women’s political participation. 
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 We investigate this by conducting a parallel analysis for Muslims, with a view to 
isolating the role of women-specific constraints from the role of intensified prejudice against 
a group with initially small representation. Muslims are the largest religious minority in India, 
constituting 14.2% of the population in 2001 (Hindus constitute the majority). We created a 
new data set containing the religious identity of all political candidates in India’s state 
elections, identifying Muslim candidates by their name. Our data show that Muslims are 
under-represented in almost all major states: over the period 1980-2010, Muslims constituted 
9.2% of all election candidates and 7.6% of election winners, and almost all (98%) of Muslim 
candidates are men. Similar to the literature on the impact of women representatives, there is 
some evidence that increasing the political representation of Muslims alters policy choices, 
leading to improved health and education outcomes (Bhalotra et al 2014). Here, we estimate 
how the share of Muslim candidates in a constituency changes in response to a Muslim 
having won the previous election in a competitive race against a non-Muslim. Just as women 
are less educated than men in India on average, Muslims are less educated than non-Muslims 
on average. In contrast to the case for women vs men, there is a significant difference in the 
party affiliations of Muslim vs non-Muslim candidates,23 so we control for party identity in 
order to isolate the effect of the religion of the politician.  
The results for Muslims are very similar to the results for women. In the election 
after a Muslim wins a state seat, there is an increase in the share of candidates who are 
Muslim in that constituency, and this is statistically significant at the 10% level (Table 8, 
Panel A, columns 1-4). Importantly, there is no increase in the fraction of new Muslim 
candidates and the coefficient estimate is negative though not statistically significant (Table 
8, Panel B). So, just as we found for women candidates, the overall effects on Muslim 
candidacy are driven by incumbent Muslim candidates being more likely to re-contest and 
there is no entry of new candidates.  
Also similar to our results for women, the coefficient of interest varies systematically 
across the states with indicators of Muslim disadvantage. The positive effects on candidacy 
are larger in states where Muslims constitute a higher share of the population (columns 5 and 
                                                
23 Muslim candidates are significantly less likely to belong to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which often 
espouses an explicit ideology of “Hindutva,” and they are significantly more likely to belong to the Indian 
National Congress (INC) or the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).  
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6), and where the literacy differential between Hindus and Muslims is smaller (columns 7 and 
8).  Using a new dataset we recently created on incidents of religious violence from 
newspaper reports in the Times of India (Kaysser et al 2014, an updated version of Varshney 
and Wilkinson 2006), we find that the candidacy response is larger in states that experienced 
fewer incidents of religious violence over the period 1980-2010 (columns 9 and 10). While 
the standard errors are too large to conclude that these estimates are statistically different, it 
is clear that the patterns are similar to the patterns observed for women’s political candidacy. 
In particular, there is a statistically significant “discouragement” of entry of new candidates 
in states where the population share of Muslims is low (Table 8, Panel B, column 5).  
The fact that the pattern of results for religious minorities is similar to the pattern we 
identified for women suggests that the results for women are unlikely to be predominantly a 
reflection of gender-specific factors. Our findings are consistent with backlash or intensified 
bias against Muslim candidates after a Muslim politician wins power.24  A related possibility, 
which is observationally similar to backlash, is that both religious minorities and women 
candidates are reluctant to come forward because of an intensification of “stereotype threat,” 
which refers to group members facing social or psychological costs to behaving differently 
from the socially accepted group stereotype. The intensification may arise from electoral 
victory might making group stereotypes salient, especially in areas where the groups face 
significant costs to violating the stereotype. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
Many reasons have been proposed for the gender gap in leadership positions. These 
include “supply-side” factors such as the lower ambition of women (Lawless and Fox 2010), 
the lack of women role models (Beaman et al 2012), women’s  aversion to competitive 
environments (Gneezy et al 2003, Petrie and Segal 2014), their fertility and family 
commitments which conflict with intensive and inflexible work schedules (Bertrand, Goldin 
and Katz 2010, Goldin 2014) and “stereotype threat,” which refers to minority groups 
                                                
24 We attempted a similar analysis distinguishing high and low castes, but this was limited by sample size 
because we are only able to identify caste for individual candidates in elections after 2003. Examining close 
elections of SC/ST candidates against others in this limited sample, we find a similar absence of 
“demonstration effects” on candidacy of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST), who are the 
historically disadvantaged caste groups. Results are available upon request.  
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behaving in ways that confirm group stereotypes when their group identity is made salient. 
There can also be “demand-side” factors such as parties or voters having greater preferences 
for male candidates.  It is often argued that the scarcity of female role models reinforces 
these preferences and prejudices. If women, voters and party leaders do not see enough 
women in a leadership role, demonstrating their success and their social acceptability 
(Lawless and Fox 2010, Pande and Ford 2012), then women winning in a competitive race 
against men may encourage the participation of the next generation of women. Also, if 
women legislators play a direct role in the selection of candidates for the next election, and 
are not contesting themselves, then they directly encourage candidacy among other women.  
Using quasi-experimental constituency variation in women winning political office, 
we identify a large and significant increase in the subsequent share of women candidates 
fielded by major parties in Indian state elections, but this is entirely driven by a greater 
propensity for incumbent women relative to incumbent men to run for re-election. Given 
that a substantial fraction of incumbents in Indian state elections do not re-run and female 
incumbents overall are less likely to re-run than male incumbents, this is an important result.  
We decisively reject that new women candidate are induced to enter politics, either in 
their own constituency or in neighboring constituencies. In fact, a woman winning office 
appears to intensify barriers to the entry of new women in areas characterized by relatively 
high levels of gender prejudice. We find similar results following a Muslim winning against a 
non-Muslim candidate, which undermines the relevance of gender-specific preferences or 
constraints.  
Ours is the first systematic analysis of political candidacy in competitive elections in 
India. Our results suggest that further economic, institutional or policy incentives may be 
needed to stimulate the entry of new women into the political arena. Not only are 
demonstration effects too weak to generate an endogenous increase in women’s candidacy, 
demonstrated success may even intensify barriers to political participation in gender-biased 
areas. Initiatives that are likely to have greater success are those targeted towards changing 
the attitudes of voters and parties in gender-biased areas, or those enabling women to 
overcome societal barriers to political participation. 
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Figure	1:	Preferences	for	Women	Politicians
A.	Vote	Share	of	Women	Politicians	Across	Different	Victory	Margins
B.	No	Discontinuity	in	Preferences	for	Women	Politicians
Notes:	Constituency-year	observations	for	the	sample	of	elections	with	at	least	one	woman	candidate.	
Notes: Constituency-year observations for the sample of elections with at least one woman candidate. Female vote
share is the vote share of all female candidates in the constituency; victory margin is the difference in vote share
between	the	top	two	vote	winners	of	opposite	genders.The	fitted	values	are	a	lowess	line.
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
Fe
ma
le-
Ma
le v
ote
 m
arg
in
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Vote share of all female candidates
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
-50 0 50
Victory Margin
female vote share Fitted values (male)
Fitted values (female)
Victory Margin Aggregated into 2.5% Bins
Mixed-gender election with female winner having margin > 0
Figure	2:	Continuity	of	the	Victory	Margin	between	Female	and	Male	Candidates
A.	Density	of	the	victory	margin
B.	Testing	for	density	discontinuities	at	zero	(McCrary	Test)
Discontinuity	estimate	in	Figure	B	(log	difference	in	height):	.0065	(	s.e.	=	0.1053)
Notes:	Sample	restricted	to	those	constituencies	where	there	was	at	least	one	woman	candidate.
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Figure	3:	Characteristics	of	Candidate	Pool	(Winners	and	Runners-up)	in	Mixed-Gender	Elections
A.	Any	criminal	charges	filed	against	candidate B.	Any	serious	criminal	charges	filed	against	candidate
C.	Candidate	has	less	than	high	school	education D.	Log	(net	worth)
E.	Candidate	is	the	incumbent F.	Candidate	belongs	to	a	woman-headed	party
G.	Candidate	belongs	to	INC	party H.	Candidate	belongs	to	BJP	party
Figure	4:		Demographic	Characteristics	and	Prior	Election	Outcomes	
A:	Population	fraction	of	women B:	Literacy	rate
C:	Population	share	of	Scheduled	Castes	and	Scheduled	Tribes D:	Male-female	literacy	differential
E:	Number	of	female	candidates	(major	parties)	in	previous	election F:	Female	voter	turnout	in	previous	election
G:	Total	votes	polled	in	previous	election
Figure	5:	Regression	Discontinuity	Estimates	for	Women's	Political	Candidacy
A:	At	least	one	woman	candidate	from	a	major	party
B:	Female	share	of	major	party	candidates
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Table	1
Women's	Electoral	Success	and	Future	Political	Candidacy:	Regression	Discontinuity	Estimates
At	least	one	
female	major	
party	
candidate
Female	share	of	
major	party	
candidates
#	of	female	
major	party	
candidates
#	of	major	
party	
candidates
Female	share	
of	competitive	
candidates
Female	share	of	
independent	
candidates
Woman	wins	
election
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel	A:	Controlling	for	quadratic	polynomials	in	the	running	variable
Woman	won 			0.185	***			 			0.085	***			 0.166	*** 0.015 0.060	*** 0.013 	-0.002
previous	election 	[0.038]					 	[0.019]					 [0.046] [0.078] [0.017] [0.012] [0.034]
R-squared
Observations 5881 5881 5881 5881 5881 5504 5881
Panel	B:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Imbens-Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth
Woman	won 0.172*** 0.091	*** 0.176*** 0.033 0.052** 0.008 	-0.027
previous	election [0.051] [0.021] [0.061] [0.090] [0.021] [0.013] [0.038]
Optimal	bw	(IK) 0.1658 0.24421 0.1775 0.2092 0.1654 0.2102 0.2766
Observations 1350 1877 1423 1638 1360 1521 2128
Panel	C:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik	optimal	bandwidth
Woman	won 0.174*** 0.088	*** 0.178	*** 0.025 0.055** 0.01 	-0.114**
previous	election [0.050] [0.024] [0.061] [0.109] [0.022] [0.016] [0.055]
Optimal	bw	(CCT) 0.1718 0.1774 0.1805 0.1509 0.1679 0.1757 0.1222
Observations 1388 1419 1446 1253 1348 1305 1044
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races
with	any	female	candidates	as	in	Meyersson	(2014).	Optimal	bandwidths	are	determined	by	the	algorithms	suggested	in	Imbens	and	Kalyanaraman	2011	(IK)	
and	Calonico,	Cattaneo	and	Titiunik	2014	(CCT).
Table	2
Impact	of	Women's	Electoral	Success	on	New	vs	Incumbent	Candidates
1 2 3 4 5
Panel	A:	Controlling	for	quadratic	polynomials	in	the	running	variable
Woman	won	previous	election -0.023	** -0.025 0.065	* 0.149*** -0.084***
[0.010] [0.024] [0.038] [0.038] [0.024]
Observations 5874 5874 5881 5881 5881
Mean	of	dependent	variable 0.04735 0.5338 0.6226 0.5092 0.1134
Panel	B:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Imbens-Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth
Woman	won	previous	election -0.024** -0.021 0.071 0.159*** -0.091	***
[0.011] [0.025] [0.043] [0.044] [0.022]
Optimal	bw	(IK) 0.2731 0.2566 0.2319 0.2352 0.3489
Observations 2105 1976 1795 1818 2889
Panel	C:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik	optimal	bandwidth
Woman	won	previous	election -0.01 -0.008 0.036 0.162*** -0.094	***
[0.017] [0.032] [0.054] [0.053] [0.030]
Optimal	bw	(CCT) 0.1247 0.1647 0.1475 0.1511 0.2112
Observations 1059 1344 1229 1254 1648
Incumbent	runs	for	
re-election	from	a	
different	party
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. New candidates are
defined as candidates who did not run in the previous election. They were identified by manual matching of candidate names across election years.
Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in
Imbens	and	Kalyanaraman	2011	(IK)	and	Calonico,	Cattaneo	and	Titiunik	2014	(CCT).
New	female	share	
of	major	party	
candidates
New	male	share	of	
major	party	
candidates
Incumbent	
runs	for	re-
election
Incumbent	runs	for	re-
election	from	the	
same	party
Table	3
Candidacy	Effects	Across	Parties	and	Across	Geographies
All	major	parties Incumbent	party All	major	parties Incumbent	party
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel	A:	Controlling	for	quadratic	polynomials	in	the	running	variable
Woman	won	previous	election 0.535*** -0.142*** 	0.001 -0.002 	0.003 	-0.007
[0.031] [0.043] [0.005] 	[0.008] [0.005] 	[0.008]
Observations 5881 5881 5867 5874 5874 5881
Mean	of	dependent	variable
Panel	B:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Imbens-Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth
Woman	won	previous	election 0.541	*** -0.161*** -0.006 -0.004 	-0.003 -0.011
[0.031] [0.051] 	[0.005] [0.008] 	[0.005] [0.009]
Optimal	bw	(IK) 0.2725 0.2063 0.2666 0.2737 0.2807 0.229
Observations 2104 1617 2064 2113 	2166 1773
Panel	C:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik	optimal	bandwidth
Woman	won	previous	election 0.536	*** -0.178	*** 		-0.007 -0.011 	-0.007 	-0.020
[0.044] [0.053] 	[0.007] [0.011] 	[0.007] 		[0.013]
Optimal	bw	(CCT) 0.133 0.1885 0.1195 0.1371 0.1217 0.1199
Observations 1116 1493 1018 1146 1041 1025
Female	share	of	major	party	candidates	
in	nearby	constituencies	(other	
constituencies	in	same	district)
Non-incumbent	
parties	have	a	
female	candidate	
(dummy)
Incumbent	party	
has	a	female	
candidate	
(dummy)
Female	share	of	major	party	candidates	
in	nearby	constituencies	(other	
constituencies	in	same	parliamentary	
constituency)
Standard	errors	in	brackets,	clustered	at	the	district	level.	***,	**,	*	indicate	significance	at	1%,	5%	and	10%	level	respectively.	Sample	includes	all	races	with	any	female	
candidates	as	in	Meyersson	(2014).	Optimal	bandwidths	are	determined	by	the	algorithms	suggested	in	Imbens	and	Kalyanaraman	2011	(IK)	and	Calonico,	Cattaneo	and	Titiunik	
2014	(CCT).
Table	4
Women's	Electoral	Success	and	Political	Candidacy:	Heterogeneity	by	State	Level	Gender	Prejudice
Low High Low High Low High
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel	A:	Controlling	for	quadratic	polynomials	in	the	running	variable
Woman	won	previous	election 							0.052** 							0.139*** 						-0.032** 						-0.002 							0.085*** 							0.141***
					[0.023] 					[0.031] 					[0.012] 					[0.020] 					[0.020] 					[0.029]
Observations 								3714 								2160 								3714 								2160 								3714 								2160
Panel	B:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Imbens-Kalyanaraman	optimal	bandwidth 			
Woman	won	previous	election 							0.041			 							0.176*** 						-0.031**	 							0.005			 							0.069*** 							0.160***
					[0.028]			 					[0.028]			 					[0.014]			 					[0.019]			 					[0.025]			 					[0.031]			
Observations 									929			 								1039			 								1195			 									867			 									887			 									825			
Optimal	bw	(IK) 0.1982 0.3643 0.254 0.3043 0.1885 0.2877
Panel	C:	Local	linear	regressions	with	Calonico-Cattaneo-Titiunik	optimal	bandwidth
Woman	won	previous	election 							0.030			 							0.121**	 						-0.035*		 							0.022			 							0.054*		 							0.053			
					[0.031]			 					[0.049]			 					[0.019]			 					[0.029]			 					[0.030]			 					[0.049]			
Observations 									781			 									347			 									648			 									480			 									648			 									342			
Optimal	bw	(CCT) 0.1625 0.0992 0.129 0.141 0.1291 0.0973
Non-new	(incumbent	+	losers)	female	
share	of	major	party	candidates
Female	population	share
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal bandwidths
are determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2011 (IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik 2014 (CCT). Low and high female population share refer to states with female population share above or
below	the	national	average.	
New	female	share	of	major	
party	candidates
Female	population	share Female	population	share
Female	share	of	major	party	
candidates
Table	5
Women's	Electoral	Success	and	Voter	Behavior
Low High Low High
1 2 3 4
Panel	A:	Voter	turnout	in	subsequent	election
Woman	won	previous	election 						-0.009			 							0.055*** 							0.003			 							0.052***
					[0.013]			 					[0.019]			 					[0.011]			 					[0.014]			
Observations 								3713			 								2158			 								3713			 								2158			
Panel	B:	Preferences	for	women	candidates
Woman	won	previous	election 						-0.033			 							0.046			 							0.028			 							0.073**	
					[0.044]			 					[0.054]			 					[0.021]			 					[0.032]			
Observations 								3714			 								2167			 								3714			 								2167			
Panel	C:	Female	share	of	major	party	candidates	in	later	elections
Woman	won	previous	election 							0.020			 							0.072*		 						-0.002			 						-0.019			
					[0.025]			 					[0.039]			 					[0.024]			 					[0.051]			
Observations 								2939			 								1649			 								2171			 								1120			
Female	population	share Female	population	share
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Regressions control for
quadratic polynomials in the running variable. See Appendix Table A4 for robustness to alternative bandwidth
selection	methods.
Second	lag Third	lag
Whether	a	woman	wins	the	next	
election
Female	Voter	Turnout Male	Voter	Turnout
Vote	share	of	all	women	
candidates
Table	6
Women's	Electoral	Success	and	Future	Candidacy:	Heterogeneity	by	Party	Gender
Low High Low High
1 2 3 4
Panel	A:	Female	share	of	major	party	candidates
Woman	won	previous	election 							0.002			 							0.008			 							0.050**	 							0.132***
					[0.012]			 					[0.023]			 					[0.022]			 					[0.028]			
Observations 								3714			 								2160			 												 								3714			 								2160			
Panel	B:	New	female	share	of	major	party	candidates
Woman	won	previous	election 						-0.015**	 						-0.012			 						-0.018*		 							0.010			
					[0.006]			 					[0.009]			 					[0.009]			 					[0.019]			
Observations 								3714			 								2160			 								3714			 								2160			
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample
includes	all	races	with	any	female	candidates	as	in	Meyersson	(2014).	Regressions	control	for	quadratic	polynomials	in	the	running	variable.	
Major	parties	headed	by	women Major	parties	headed	by	men
Female	population	share Female	population	share
Major	parties	headed	by	women Major	parties	headed	by	men
Table	7
Women's	Electoral	Success	and	Political	Candidacy	Before	and	After	Local	Government	Quotas
No Yes No Yes
1 2 3 4
Panel	A:	Female	share	of	major	party	candidates
Woman	won	previous	election 							0.019			 							0.094*** 							0.224*** 							0.085**	
					[0.030]			 					[0.035]			 					[0.054]			 					[0.041]			
Observations 								2220			 								1494			 									855			 								1305			
Panel	B:	New	female	share	of	major	party	candidates
Woman	won	previous	election 						-0.029**	 						-0.038*		 						-0.014			 						-0.001			
					[0.015]			 					[0.021]			 					[0.032]			 					[0.025]			
Observations 								2220			 								1494			 									855			 								1305			
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Regressions control for quadratic polynomials in the
running	variable.	
Local	government	quotas Local	government	quotas
Female	population	share	is	low Female	population	share	is	high
Female	population	share	is	low Female	population	share	is	high
Table	8
Muslims'	Electoral	Success	and	Future	Political	Candidacy:	Regression	Discontinuity	Estimates
Low High High Low High Low
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.028 0.037	* 0.094	*** 0.050 0.015 0.045	** 0.033 0.067	* 0.02 0.133	***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.031] [0.053] [0.021] [0.023] [0.037] [0.021] [0.045]
Observations 7636 7636 2447 1392 1787 5849 4820 2816 5718 1918
-0.028 -0.023 -0.009 -0.005 -0.085	** -0.01 -0.016 -0.04 -0.009 -0.014
[0.019] [0.019] [0.017] [0.026] [0.041] [0.020] [0.022] [0.032] [0.018] [0.042]
Observations 7636 7636 3430 1444 1787 5849 4820 2816 5718 1918
Polynomial 2nd	order 2nd	order 2nd	order 2nd	order 2nd	order 2nd	order 2nd	order 2nd	order
Bandwidth
optimal	
(IK)
optimal	
(CCT)
Party	controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hindu-Muslim	literacy	
differential
Muslim	won	previous	
election
Muslim	won	previous	
election
#	incidents	of	religious	
violence
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any
Muslim candidates. Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2011 (IK) and Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik 2014
(CCT). In each case, the first column in a pair indicates a stronger potential Muslim disadvantage. Muslim population share and Hindu-Muslim literacy differential data
are from 2001 state-level census for 16 major states. Classification for population share is bottom 8 states (low population share) versus top 8. Classification for
literacy	differential	is	less	than	1	percentage	point	(low	differential)	versus	others.	Incidents	of	religious	violence	are	measured	over	1980-2010.
Panel	B:	New	Muslim	candidate	share	in	major	parties
Muslim	population	
share
Panel	A:	Muslim	share	of	major	party	candidates
Appendix	Figures	and	Tables
Figure	A1:	Women's	Political	Candidacy	in	Major	Indian	States,	1980-2007
A.	Women's	Political	Candidacy	over	Time
B.	Female	Share	of	Major	Party	Candidates	in	Major	Indian	States
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Figure	A2:	Testing	for	Discontinuities	at	"Fake"	Discontinuity	Points
Note:	Graph	plotes	the	t-statistics	of	different	placebo	tests	conducted	at	alternative	placebo	discontinuities
between	percentiles	5	and	95	of	the	distribution.	The	t-statistic	of	the	discontinuity	at	zero	is	the	one	of	our
main	estimates.	Specifications	restrict	the	sample	to	observations	either	at	the	left	or	at	the	right	of	the
discontinuity	and	include	a	split	second	order	polynomial	aproximation.
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Figure	A3:	Women's	Electoral	Success	and	the	Entry	of	New	Female	Candidates
A.	States	with	lower	female	population	share
B.	States	with	higher	female	population	share
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Table	A1
Descriptive	Statistics
Whole	Sample Obs Mean Std.	Dev Min Max
Female	share	of	major	party	candidates 22420 0.056 0.156 0 1
New	female	share	of	major	party	candidates 22420 0.038 0.129 0 1
Female	share	of	competitive	candidates 22478 0.050 0.134 0 1
Female	share	of	independent	candidates 20649 0.037 0.116 0 1
Female	voter	turnout 22421 0.587 0.154 0 1
Male	voter	turnout 22415 0.664 0.124 0.004 1
Woman	won	previous	election	(dummy) 22296 0.048 0.214 0 1
Regression	Discontinuity	Sample Obs Mean Std.	Dev Min Max
Female	share	of	major	party	candidates 5874 0.114 0.209 0 1
New	female	share	of	major	party	candidates 5874 0.047 0.142 0 1
Female	share	of	competitive	candidates 5881 0.103 0.182 0 1
Female	share	of	independent	candidates 5504 0.055 0.140 0 1
Female	voter	turnout 5871 0.575 0.146 0.009 0.975
Male	voter	turnout 5871 0.652 0.123 0.011 0.989
Woman	won	previous	election	(dummy) 5881 0.182 0.386 0 1
Note:	the	regression	discontinuity	sample	includes	all	constituencies	with	at	least	one	female	candidate.
Table	A2
Women's	Electoral	Success	and	Future	Political	Participation:	OLS	Estimates
Any	female	
major	party	
candidate
Female	share	of	
major	party	
candidates
Female	share	of	
competitive	
candidates
New	female	
share	of	major	
party	
candidates
Woman	wins	
election
Vote	share	
received	by	
women	
candidates
1 2 3 4 5 6
Woman	won	previous	election 0.244** 0.110	*** 0.097	*** -0.083	*** 							0.010 0.084	***
[0.018] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] 					[0.016] 					[0.009]
												 												
R-squared 0.38 0.40 0.22 								0.33 								0.42
Observations 22296 22238 22296 22238 							22296 							22296
Standard	errors	in	brackets,	clustered	at	the	constituency	level.	***,	**,	*	indicate	significance	at	1%,	5%	and	10%	level	respectively.
All	regressions	control	for	constituency	and	election	cycle	fixed	effects,	and	district	specific	trends.
Table	A3
Regression	Discontinuity	Estimates:	Robustness	to	Changes	in	Functional	Form,	Bandwidth	and	Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Woman	won	previous	election 0.074*** 0.080	*** 0.066	** 0.100	*** 0.081*** 			0.085	***			 0.092	*** 0.060**
[0.023] [0.028] [0.031] [0.022] [0.019] 	[0.019]					 [0.023] [0.031]
R-squared
Observations 5874 5874 853 449 5874 5881 1897 931
polynomial 3rd	order 4rd	order linear none 2nd	order 2nd	order 2nd	order linear
bandwidth
0.1 0.05
optimal	(IK)	0.121
State*year	fixed	effects yes
Constituency	level	clustering yes
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level, except as indicated. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes
all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Restricted sample consists of electoral races in which a man and a woman were the top two candidates.
Optimal	bandwidths	are	determined	by	the	algorithms	suggested	in	Imbens	and	Kalyanaraman	2011	(IK).
Dependent	variable:	Female	share	of	major	party	candidates
Restricted	sample
Table	A4
Heterogeneous	Effects	by	Indicators	of	Gender	Prejudice:	Robustness	to	Measures
High Low Low High Low High
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel	A:	Female	share	of	major	party	candidates
Woman	won	previous	election 							0.070*** 							0.113*** 							0.044 							0.112*** 							0.066** 							0.100***
					[0.023] 					[0.035] 					[0.029] 					[0.025] 					[0.027] 					[0.028]
Observations 								3769 								2105 								2232 								3642 								2765 								3109
			 			
Panel	B:	New	female	share	of	major	party	candidates
Woman	won	previous	election 						-0.030** 						-0.005 						-0.051*** 						-0.006 						-0.043*** 						-0.007
					[0.012] 					[0.020] 					[0.015] 					[0.014] 					[0.015] 					[0.015]
Observations 								3769 								2105 								2232 								3642 								2765 								3109
			
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any
female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman 2011 (IK) and Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik 2014 (CCT). Male-female literacy differential is based on 2001 state-level data. Low and High female population share refer to states with
female population share above or below the nationwide average. These measures are alternatives to the 2001 state-level female population share used in Table 4 as
a	proxy	for	gender	bias.
Male-female	literacy	
differential
Female	population	share	(1981	
state	level)
Female	population	share	(2001	
constituency	level)
